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AFFILIATION OF POLITICAL ACTION
COMMITTEES UNDER THE
ANTIPROLIFERATION
AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF 1971
Through the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 , Congress sought
to remedy the "excessive influence of great wealth" on campaigns for federal office. 2 To accomplish this objective, the Act incorporated provisions
of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925' and the Labor Management
Relations Act of 19474 that make it unlawful for corporations or labor
organizations to contribute funds in connection with a federal election
campaign.5 These provisions do not, however, prohibit the creation of political action committees (PAC's) to solicit and collect voluntary political
contributions which are separate and segregated from general treasury
funds.6 Thus, a corporation or a labor organization, prohibited by federal
law from contributing funds to a federal election campaign, may establish
a PAC with contributions from its directors and employees and distribute
those funds to the candidates of its choice.7
Since the enactment of the 1974 amendments, 8 the Act has imposed
stringent dollar limits on the amount of contributions made to candidates
1. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 and in scattered sections of 18, 47 U.S.C.), as amendedby Pub. L.
No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
2. S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin[ 1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5587, 5591.
3. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074
(current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976)) (national banks and corporations prohibited
from contributing to federal election campaigns).
4. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, ch. 120, tit. III, § 304, 61
Stat. 136, 159 (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976)) (extending the prohibitions of
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act to labor organizations).
5. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976).
6. Id § 441b(b)(2)(C). See United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973) (contributions permitted from separate segregated funds if the
contributions to it are voluntary).
7. Contributions and expenditures made by corporations, labor organizations, membership organizations, cooperatives, or corporations without capital stock may be lawful if
they relate to "the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a sepa2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C)
rate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes .
(1976).
8. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
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for federal office. 9 These contribution ceilings, in combination with the
prohibition against corporate and labor union contributions, provide a political candidate incentive to appeal to a wide range of campaign fund
sources and underscore the importance of PAC's as the sole means of corporate and labor union input in the political fund-raising process. The
obvious temptation faced by corporate and labor campaign contributors is
to maximize their restricted input by increasing the number of PAC's; that
is, to "proliferate."' 0
Recognizing the potential for abuse, Congress enacted "antiproliferation
amendments" in 1976."1 These amendments, although designed to curtail
the "vertical" proliferation' 2 of political committees' 3 and otherwise to
prevent corporations and other groups from evading the contribution lim9. The Act provides in pertinent part:
(1)No person shall make contributions (A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any
election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000;
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national political
party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in any
calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $20,000; or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000.
(2) No multicandidate political committee shall make contributions (A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to any
election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000;
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national political
party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in any
calendar year, which, in the aggregate, exceed $15,000; or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year, which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000.
(3) No individual shall make contributions aggregating more than $25,000 in any
calendar year...
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)-(3) (1976).
10. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 28-29 n.31 (1975); cf Comment, The Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971. Reform of the PoliticalProcess?, 60 GEO. L.J. 1309, 1324
(1972) (repeal of contribution limitations eliminates the chief incentive to proliferate committees).
1I.Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat.
475 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 U.S.C.).
12. "Vertical proliferation" is not specifically defined in the legislative history, but its
intended meaning may be inferred from several sources. See notes 14, 33, 95, 96 and accompanying text infra. For purposes of this Note, "vertical proliferation" describes the situation
of a single collective entity, e.g., a corporation or a labor organization whose campaign
contribution input is limited to the $5,000 per candidate per election its PAC may contribute, which seeks to exceed that limitation by increasing the number of PAC's to which the
entity's directors and employees may contribute. For a proliferation of PAC's to be an effective vehicle toward realization of an entity's political interests, the parent PAC must exercise
some control over the disposition of contributions made by the newly created PAC's. See
note 10 and accompanying text supra.

1980]

Ai/iation of PoliticalAction Committees

its,14 provide little guidance to the Federal Election Commission (Commission)' 5 in determining when proliferation has actually occurred.
Particularly unclear is the status of contributions made to one candidate
from both a trade association's PAC and the PAC of one of its member
corporations or from both the AFL-CIO's PAC and the PAC of one of its
member unions. Depending upon the circumstances, these contributions
may or may not be instances of vertical proliferation of political committees.
This Note examines the Commission's performance in applying the statutory and regulatory standards that define occurrences of proliferation. It
focuses on the relationships between the AFL-CIO and its member unions
and between a trade association and its member corporations because
these relationships currently produce great potential for uncertainty to
both candidates and contributors. Finally, the Note attempts to mitigate
some of that uncertainty by identifying the factual indicia that will most
likely result in judicial findings of proliferation and suggests an interpretive principle to guide future determinations concerning the existence of
proliferation.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY STANDARDS
GOVERNING PROLIFERATION

The primary objectives of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197116
were to render the media more accessible and less expensive to candidates
for federal office' 7 and to obtain broad disclosure of federal campaign
funds.1 8 To effectuate these goals, Title I of the Act (Campaign Communications Reform Act) established ceilings for the expenditure of campaign
funds on television advertising' 9 but maintained the candidates' access to
the media by requiring that candidates be charged no more than the "lowest unit rate" charged to commercial advertisers.2" Title III required all
individuals contributing over $10021 and all political committees contrib13. S. REP. No. 677, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 929, 937-38.
14. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 929, 973.
15. The Federal Election Commission, established pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 437c (1976)
was given broad powers to supervise and enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act. Id §
437d.
16. See note 1 supra.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441j (1976).
Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. I, § 104(a), 86 Stat. 5 (1972) (repealed 1974).
47 U.S.C. § 315(b), 2 U.S.C. § 435(a) (1976).
2 U.S.C. § 4 3 4(e)(1) (1976).
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uting over $1,000 to account for campaign expenditures and receipts 2 2 and
24
23
to submit financial reports for public inspection.

The disclosure provisions were intended to discourage the solicitation
and acceptance of large sums of money from single contributions. The
Act, however, did not become effective until April 7, 1972, too late for
those provisions to have any cognizable effect on contributions to the 1972
Presidential campaigns. The spectacle of the last-minute "scramble" to
raise large-sum political contributions prior to April 7, and thus avoid the
new disclosure provisions, subjected the Act to intense criticism for its lack
of any express contibution limitations.2 5
The 1974 amendments to the Act represented Congress' response to that
criticism. In addition to establishing an independent federal agency, the
Federal Election Commission2 6 , the amendments limited the amount of
money a person or committee could contribute to a political candidate.
Contributions by private individuals and by PAC's were limited to $1,000
and $5,000 respectively per candidate per election.2 7
Shortly after the passage of the 1974 amendments, the Commission was
alerted to the susceptibility of those contribution ceilings to circumvention
by those who might attempt to establish multiple PAC's.2 8 An early case
22. Id § 432(c), (d).
23. Id § 434(a).
24. Id § 439.
25. S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5587, 5588.

26. See note 15 supra.
27. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (2) (1976).
28. The Act defines "political committee" as "any committee, club, association, or other
group of persons which receives contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year
in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000." Id § 431(d). The Act also mandates that each
candidate for federal office designate his "principal campaign committee." Id § 432(e)(1).
Expenditures made by and contributions made to a candidate's principal campaign committee are deemed to be made to or on behalf of the candidate himself for the purposes of
expenditure and contribution limitations. Id § 441a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), (b)(2)(A), (b)(2)(B).
The primary function of this "committee" is to centralize a candidate's financial affairs to
help streamline the Commission's work in monitoring each candidate's campaign.
Under the Act's definition of "multicandidate political committee," a committee may contribute up to $5,000 per candidate per election only if the committee: (a) has been registered
pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 433 (1976) for at least six months; (b) has received contributions from
more than 50 persons; and, (c) has made contributions to at least five candidates for federal
office. Id § 441a(a)(4). Any "committee" that does not meet these standards might still
fulfill the requirements of "committee" for disclosure and registration purposes but would
be deemed a "person" for purposes of the contribution limitations of § 441a. See id §
43 1(h) (person "means an individual, partnership, committee, association, corporation, labor
organization, and any other organization or group of persons"). Such a committee would
thus be subject to the $ 1,000 contribution limitation of § 441 a(a)(I) and would not be entitled to the $5,000 limitation of § 441a(a)(2). This Note is primarily concerned with the
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involved the establishment of several PAC's in 1975 by the Agricultural
and Dairy Educational Political Trust (ADEPT), a multicandidate PAC
under the Act.2 9 ADEPT requested an advisory opinion3" from the Commission to determine whether the contribution limitations of section
441a(a)(2) would apply to ADEPT and each new PAC separately or in the
aggregate. The Commission responded that, if two or more committees
were controlled by the same person or group of persons, those committees
would be regarded as one entity and the aggregate amount contributed by
them to any one candidate could not exceed the $5,000 limitation imposed
by section 441a(a)(2).3 1 The Commission found the proposed PAC's to be
commonly controlled by ADEPT primarily on the basis of their total dependence on fund transfers from ADEPT, and also because they would
presumably share their treasurer and membership with ADEPT.3 2 Those
factors combined to limit the extent to which the new PAC's could exercise
"independent judgment" in selecting the recipients of their campaign contributions.33 The Commission observed that it was actively reviewing the
entire area of commonly controlled multicandidate committees and would,
"in determining the existence of common control, 4look beyond form to the
3
substance of relationships between committees.
Before the Commission could promulgate regulations or define the
scope of common control envisioned in its ADEPT Advisory Opinion,
Congress enacted the 1976 amendments to the Act.35 These amendments
set forth the statutory standard for "proliferation" and established the
somewhat cryptic analytical framework for examination of common control of political committees. For purposes of the $5,000 limitation imposed
on PAC contributions, section 441a(a)(5) was added, providing that:
all contributions made by political committees established or
"multicandidate political committee," for in that form, the PAC may maximize its ability to

exercise political influence. See Walther v. Federal Election Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 1235,
1237 n.4 (D.D.C. 1979).
29. Advisory Op. No. 1975-45, FED. ELEC CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) $ 5142 (Nov. 19,

1975).
30. Advisory opinions may be requested of the Commission
by any individual holding Federal office, any candidate for Federal office, any political committee, or the national committee of any political party concerning the
application of a general rule of law stated in the Act . . .or a general rule of law
prescribed as a rule or regulation by the Commission, to a specific factual situation.
2 U.S.C. § 437f(a) (1976).
31. Advisory Op. No. 1975-45, supra note 29.
32. Id at 10,073.
33. Id
34. Id
35. See note II supra.
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financed or maintained or controlled by any corporation, labor
organization, or any other person, including any parent, subsidiary, branch, division, department, or local unit of such corporation, labor organization, or any other person, or by any group of
such persons, shall be considered to have been made by a single
political committee. . . . In any case in which a corporation and
any of its subsidiaries, branches, divisions, departments, or local
units, or a labor organization and any of its subsidiaries,
branches, divisions, departments, or local units establish or
finance or maintain or control more than one separate segregated
fund, all such separate segregated funds shall be treated as a single separate segregated fund .
*36
This antiproliferation provision creates two standards by which the
Commission may infer common control, or "affiliation, '3 7 between two or
more PAC's: aperse rule and a rule of reason. The last clause sets out the
per se rule that all PAC's created by a corporation or a labor organization
and any of its respective subdivisions are per se affiliated and subject to a
single $5,000 contribution limitation. The Commission has construed the
per se rule in its 1976 regulations to impose affiliation status upon organizational relationships such as the PAC's of single corporations and their
subsidiaries, single international unions and their local unions, the AFLCIO and all its state and local central bodies, membership organizations,
including trade associations and the Chamber of Commerce, and their local bodies, and "multiple committees established by a group of persons."3
Indicia of affiliation in such cases need not even be investigated.
The first clause of section 441 a(a)(5), however, reflects the Commission's
commitment to "look beyond form to the substance of relationships between committees,"3 9 and establishes a rule of reason for the analysis of
affiliation. Under this provision, a PAC established by a group that is not
specifically a subsidiary, branch, division, department, or local unit of a
corporation or labor organization that has also established a PAC, may
nonetheless be found to be affiliated with that corporation or labor organization if both PAC's are established, financed, maintained, or controlled
by a common entity. The Commission's regulations outline a number of
factors it will look to in determining whether two or more PAC's are com36. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (1976).
37. This Note uses "affiliated" as a synonym for "established or financed or maintained
or controlled." Id The term as a word of art appears to have been coined by the Commission in its regulations. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.14(c), 110.3 (1977).
38. 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.14(c)(2)(i), 110.3(a)(l)(ii) (1977). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 929, 973.
39. Advisory Op. No. 1975-45, supra note 29.
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monly controlled. These indicia of affiliation include: ownership of controlling interests in voting shares or securities; provisions of bylaws or
constitutions by which one entity has the authority or the ability to direct
the affairs of another; the authority of one entity to make personnel decisions for another; similar patterns of contributions; or the transfer of a
substantial portion of one entity's funds to another.4"
Due to their general nature, the dual statutory antiproliferation standards require substantial judicial and administrative interpretation. Although the Commission's regulations specify some examples of per se
affiliation and enumerate some indicia to be considered in a rule of reason
analysis of affiliation, the application and effect of both standards on a
wide variety of political fund-raising organizations have yet to be conclusively determined. More specifically, the status of the relationships between the AFL-CIO and its member unions and between trade
associations and their member corporations remains unresolved for failure
of the statute and the administrative regulations expressly to address those
relationships. While the antiproliferation standards and indicia can be
rather routinely applied to blatant occurrences of proliferation, their application to situations involving membership organizations is much less certain. These relationships raise questions of affiliation because they often
involve groups with similar political interests that pursue common political
goals in a spirit of coalition and cooperation. To conclude that these
groups are affiliated, however, may not be consistent with the purposes of
the legislation. Whether such situations manifest occurrences of proliferation requires an examination of the intended parameters of the per se rule
of affiliation and an examination of those affiliation indicia that most accurately reflect the abuses sought to be remedied by the 1976 amendments.
II.

WALTHER

V FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION -

APPLICATION

OF THE PER SE RULE DOES NOT EXTEND TO INSTANCES OF
NONAFFILIATION

Only one case, Walther v. FederalElection Commission, 4 has addressed
squarely the issue of the per se rule's applicability to membership organizations. In Walther, the Commission argued that section 441a(a)(5) implies, in effect, aper se rule of nonaffiliation between the AFL-CIO's PAC
(the Committee on Political Education - COPE) and the PAC's of AFLCIO member unions. In October and November of 1978, the Commission
had reviewed forty-five complaints filed by Henry Walther and the Na40. See 11 C.F.R. § ll0.3(a)(I)(iii) (1977).
41. 468 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1979).

See also id § 100.14(c)(2)(ii).
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tional Right to Work Committee (NRWC).4 2 Each complaint alleged that
a candidate or his principal campaign committee had violated the Act4 3 by
knowingly accepting illegal campaign contributions. The NRWC alleged
that these candidates had accepted contributions totaling more than $5,000
from COPE and from the PAC's of AFL-CIO member unions." According to the NRWC, since the AFL-CIO and its member unions were affiliated within the meaning of section 44la(a)(5), the contributions exceeded
the $5,000 statutory ceiling. 45 The Commission dismissed the complaints
without investigation, stating that the AFL-CIO and its members were not
affiliated under section 441a(a)(5) and, therefore, the NRWC had not
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.46
Upon Walther's filing of a petition with the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, alleging that the Commission had improperly
dismissed the forty-five complaints, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss, again arguing that the complaints failed to state a violation of the
Act. 47 The Commission relied most heavily on the catalog of per se affili42. Id at 1237. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (1976) provides that "[any person who believes a

violation of this Act ... has occurred may file a complaint with the Commission."
43. 468 F. Supp. at 1237. The Act states:
No candidate or political committee shall knowingly accept any contribution or
make any expenditure in violation of the provisions of this section. No officer or
employee of a political committee shall knowingly accept a contribution made for
the benefit or use of a candidate, or knowingly make any expenditure on behalf of
a candidate, in violation of any limitation imposed on contributions and expenditures under this section.
2 U.S.C. § 441a(f) (1976).
44. 468 F. Supp. at 1237. For an example of the complaints filed with the Commission,
see In re Federal Election Campaign Act Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1044, 1048-50 (D.D.C.
1979).
45. 468 F. Supp. at 1237-38.
46. Id at 1237. The NRWC filed a complaint in 1977 against the AFL-CIO and its
member unions for similar alleged violations of § 441a(a)(5). The Commission dismissed
that complaint in December, 1977, for the same reasons that it dismissed the 1978 complaints. See Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 2,
Walther v. Federal Election Comm'n, 468 F. Supp. 1235 (D.D.C. 1979) (C.A. Nos. 78-209,
78-2193).
47. 468 F. Supp. at 1237. The Act provides:
(A) Any party aggrieved by an order of the Commission dismissing a complaint
filed by such party under [§ 437g(a)(1)], or by a failure on the part of the Commission to act on such complaint in accordance with the provisions of this section
within 90 days after the filing of such complaint, may file a petition with the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia.
(C) ITIhe court may declare that the dismissal of the complaint or the action, or
the failure to act, is contrary to law and may direct the Commission to proceed in
conformity with such declaration within 30 days, failing which the complainant
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ated relationships set forth in the Commission's regulations.4 8 From these
per se inclusionary provisions, the Commission attempted to infer aperse
exclusionary rule that would automatically remove the relationship between COPE and the PAC's of AFL-CIO member unions from the scope
of section 441a(a)(5). The Commission reasoned that if the Conference
drafters had intended to treat the AFL-CIO and its member unions as per
se affiliated for purposes of section 441a(a)(5), they would have expressly
stated their intent. Judge Richey rejected this position, referring to one of
the Commission's own regulations treating all political committees set up
by the same group of persons as a single political committee. 49 This regulation, the court stated, was far more relevant to the relationship between
the AFL-CIO and its member unions than was the Commission's inference
of afper se rule of exclusion."0 In addition, since the relationship between
the AFL-CIO and its member unions was not the subject of any statutory
or regulatory per se rule, the substance of the relationship warranted examination in terms of a rule of reason and specific indicia of affiliation.
Finding that "the relationship alleged in [Walther's] complaint may constitute a violation," the court denied the Commission's motion to dismiss:I
The Commission took preliminary steps to appeal the denial of its motion to dismiss,5 2 maintaining that the legislative history of the 1976
may bring in his own name a civil action to remedy the violation involved in the
original complaint.
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(9)(A), (C) (1976).
Causes of action under § 437g(a)(9)(A) have been narrowly defined. The sole issue under
such cases is the propriety of the Commission's decision to dismiss or to refuse to investigate
a complaint. As such, the court is concerned only with the information contained in the
complaint itself. Information regarding some of the allegations of the complaint possessed
by third parties is immaterial to a § 437g(a)(9)(A) case and is not discoverable. Walther v.
Federal Election Comm'n, 82 F.R.D. 200 (D.D.C. 1979). In addition, private causes of action do not accrue until a party exhausts the administrative remedies provided by §
437g(a)(9)(A) and (C). Thus, Walther's earlier action against Congressman Max Baucus
was premature because it was initiated prior to the United States District Court's ruling on
the Commission's dismissal of Walther's complaint against the Congressman. Walther v.
Baucus, 467 F. Supp. 93 (D. Mont. 1979). See also In re Federal Election Campaign Act
Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1051 (D.D.C. 1979).
48. 468 F. Supp. at 1240-41. See generall note 38 and accompanying text supra.
49. 468 F. Supp. at 1241. See 11 C.F.R. § ll0.3(a)(l)(ii)(E) (1977).
50. 468 F. Supp. at 1241.
51. Id
52. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), the Commission requested the court to
amend its order denying the Commission's motion to dismiss to include a statement noting
that the order involved controlling questions of law as to which there was substantial ground
for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order might materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. See Petition to Amend April 17, 1979
Order, Walther v. Federal Election Comm'n, note 46 supra.
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amendments 53 demonstrated Congress' intention to establish separate limitations for the AFL-CIO and for its member unions. 5 4 The appeal, however, was rendered moot by the granting of summary judgment in the
Commission's favor. 5 On cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge
Richey first analyzed the standard of judicial review of a Commission decision to dismiss or refuse to investigate a complaint. The court held that
the Commission must take all "available" information into consideration
in reaching a decision to dismiss but did not require it to initiate an investigation on the basis of every complaint received. 6 Stating that it would
reverse an administrative decision to dismiss or refuse to investigate only if
that decision were arbitrary and capricious,5 7 the court found the Commission's decision "eminently reasonable" and granted its motion for summary judgment. 8 Since Walther's complaints to the Commission were a
factually inadequate "shambles," 5 9 the court, in effect, deferred to the
Commission's judgment in deciding not to engage in a full-scale judicial
investigation of what it found to be nonmeritorious allegations.6" Thus,
the court
found that the Commission's duty to investigate was not unqualified. 6 1
53. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprintedin [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 929, 973; notes 62, 63, 65 and accompanying text infra.
54. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Amend April 17, 1979 Order at 3-5,
Walther v. Federal Election Comm'n, note 46 supra.
55. In re Federal Election Campaign Act Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1044 (D.D.C. 1979).
56. Id at 1046.
57. Id
58. Id at 1046, 1048.
59. Id at 1047.
60. Id Walther alleged that certain candidates knowingly accepted contributions in
excess of the limits imposed by § 441a(a)(I) & (2). Knowing acceptance is a violation of §
441a(f). See note 43 supra. Walther, however, incorrectly alleged a violation of §
441a(a)(2). In addition, he made no showing of any knowledge of illegality on the part of
the candidates accepting the contributions. Moreover, he offered no evidence of affiliation
between COPE and the various labor union PAC's. In all of the complaints, he alleged only
that "[ilt
is clear from the past statements of Mr. Meany and Mr. Barkan, his political staffer,
that the political efforts of the AFL-CIO and its member unions, are coordinated and commonly directed in exactly the way contemplated by the statute's prohibition." 474 F. Supp.
at 1048.
61. Id at 1046-48. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(2) (1976) provides:
The Commission, upon receiving a complaint under [§ 437g(a)(l)], and f it has
reason to believe that any person has committed a violation of this Act . . .or, if
the Commission, on the basis of information ascertained in the normal course of
carrying out its supervisory responsibilities, has reason to believe that such a violation has occurred, shall notify the person involved of such alleged violation and
shall make an investigation of such alleged violation in accordance with the provisions of this section.
Id (emphasis added).
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APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF REASON: INDICIA OF AFFILIATION

Despite the Walther court's refusal to imply a per se rule of nonaffiliation, language appearing in the legislative history of the 1976 amendments
suggests that per se nonaffiliation was intended by the drafters to apply to
the relationship between the AFL-CIO and its member unions. The Senate version of the antiproliferation amendments contained three exceptions, the third of which stated that the PAC of a national organization
would not be precluded from contributing to a candidate merely because it
is affiliated with the PAC of another national organization which has already made the maximum contribution to the same candidate.62 Senator
Cannon, in support of this exception, noted that the amendments, while
requiring aggregation of maximum contributions from a national union
PAC and the PAC of one of its locals, would allow maximum contributions from both the national union's PAC and the AFL-CIO's COPE.6 3
The Walther court correctly observed that Senator Cannon's remarks
referred to an exception in the Senate bill that was not included in the final
conference version.6 4

It is apparent, however, that the members of the

House, whose version of the bill ultimately was adopted by the Conference
Committee, read that exception into the bill even though it was not expressly included in the House version. Chairman Hays of the House Committee on Administration, for example, in explaining the antiproliferation
provisions to his colleagues on the Committee, cited the relationship between a trade association PAC and the PAC of a member corporation and
the relationship between COPE and the PAC's of AFL-CIO member unions as "specifically exempted" from the aggregation provisions of section
441a(a)(5). 65 Although such a specific exemption is absent from the lan62. 122 CONG. REC. 6694 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Cannon).
63. According to Senator Cannon,
[t]he proposed rule ... would not preclude a national union through its political
committee, such as for example, the boilermakers, from making a maximum contribution to a candidate through its national political committee in the event that
COPE, the political cbmmittee of the AFL-CIO, with which the boilermakers are
affiliated, has already made its maximum contribution to that candidate. On the
other hand, the proposed rule would prevent the various local unions of the boilermakers from making a similar maximum contribution through their local political
committees when such a maximum contribution has already been made from the
national political committee of the boilermakers.
Id
64. 468 F. Supp. at 1240. The final version of the amendment was that submitted by the
House. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprintedin [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 929, 973.
65. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 Hearings on HR. 12406 Before

the House Comm. on House Administration, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (March 9, 1976), [here-
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guage of both the statute and the regulations, it nevertheless is arguable
that such an exemption was contemplated by the drafters at the time of the
enactment of the 1976 amendments.
The Walther court, however, refused to base its decision on nonexistent
statutory language, instead determining that no per se rule of nonaffiliation applies to the relationship between the AFL-CIO and its member unions. Rather, that relationship, as it involves the contribution limits of
section 441a(a)(5), must be determined by a Commission investigation of
the various indicia of affiliation. 66 By granting summary judgment in the
Commission's favor, the Walther court did not have to identify the factual
circumstances that it would require for stating a meritorious claim under
the Act. The formulation of standards by which to identify those circumstances requires an examination of the various indicia of affiliation that the
Commission has employed in the past. By themselves, the affiliation indicia in the Commission's regulations67 provide little guidance as to what
combination of circumstances warrant a finding of affiliation;68 however,
some consistent standards have emerged from the Commission's advisory
opinions.
The Commission consistently has found franchisees and franchisors affiliated, for example, primarily on the basis of contractual obligations beinafter cited as Hearings on HR. 12406] quotedin Exhibit A at 20, Petition to Amend, supra

note 52. Chairman Hays said
that an international union can set up a PAC and all of its local unions, state
unions, etc., would be treated as a single political committee. In other words, the
total they could contribute would be $5,000. Then the AFL-CIO which is a voluntary conglomerate and all its state and central bodies would be treated as a single
political committee and . . . they could give up to $5,000 in any fragments they
wanted to.

As I view it if the national association of Manufacturers had a PAC and any
corporation contributed to it, then the NAM could contribute $5,000 and the corporation could, exactly the same as the steel workers could and COPE, UAW-CIO

[sic] can. But those are the exceptions.
Hearingson HR. 12406 supra at 42-43, 47 (March 8, 1976), quoted in Exhibit A at 4-5, 9,

Petition to Amend, supra note 52. The following day, this exchange occurred:
MR. BRADEMAS:.

.

. I think what this amendment does.

. .

is [to] permit two

contributions up to $5,000? That may or may not be a good thing.
CHAIRMAN HAYS: No, it doesn't do that except in the case of COPE which is
specifically exempted.

Hearings on HR. 12406 supra at 13 (March 9, 1976), quoted in Exhibit A at 20, Petition to
Amend, supra note 52.
66. 468 F. Supp. at 1241. See generally text accompanying note 40 supra.
67. See note 40 supra.
68. Vandegrift, Walther May Severely Limit Union Contributions,Legal Times of Wash-

ington, May 28, 1979, at 10, col. 1.
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tween the two regarding business policies, practices, and procedures.6 9
The Commission noted that licensees and franchisees of fast-food chains
were required to abide by the strict standards and policies of their agreements with the franchisors. As an illustration, the "McDonald's System"
provided an elaborate scheme which detailed all operations of each restaurant and severely restricted the transferability of licenses. Enforcement of
the scheme was accomplished by prompt termination of the license upon
material breach of its terms.7" On these facts, the licensing corporation
exercised sufficient control over the franchisees to amount to affiliation. 7'
Commissioners Staebler and Harris dissented to the franchisor-franchisee advisory opinions. 72 Although recognizing the pervasiveness of the
control exercised by the franchisors in these cases, the dissenters appeared
to advocate aper se rule of nonaffiliation in the context of franchisor-franchisee relationships. They found the variety of franchise relationships too
numerous and complex to justify a conclusion of affiliation.73 Furthermore, the dissenters contended that if all franchisor-franchisee relationships were not excluded from the scope of affiliation, they should be
69. See Advisory Op. No. 1978-39, FED. ELEC. CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5372 (Nov.
20, 1978); Advisory Op. No. 1978-61, FED. ELEC. CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5359 (Oct. 10,
1978); Advisory Op. No. 1977-70, FED. ELEC. CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5303 (Mar. 29,
1978).
70. Advisory Op. No. 1977-70, supra note 69, at 10,263.
71. Id See also Advisory Op. No. 1978-6 1, supra note 69.
McDonald's had requested a finding of affiliation between it and its franchisees so that it
might solicit them for contributions to its PAC pursuant to the requirements of 2 U.S.C. §
441b(b)(4)(A) (1976) and 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(1) (1977). The regulation provides:
A corporation, or a separate segregated fund established by a corporation is prohibited from soliciting contributions to such a fund from any person other than its
stockholders and their families and its executive or administrative personnel and
their families. A corporation may solicit the executive or administrative personnel
of its subsidiaries, branches, divisions, and affiliates and their families.
Il C.F.R. § 114.5(g)(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
But cf. Advisory Op. No. 1978-75, FED. ELEC. CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5368 (Oct. 30,
1978) (PAC of a subsidiary corporation may solicit the shareholders of the parent corporation). "Affiliates" is not defined by the regulations, but apparently the Commission felt that
the same indicia applied to both affiliated committees and corporate "affiliates."
72. Advisory Op. No. 1978-61, supra note 69, at 10,363; Advisory Op. No. 1977-70,
supra note 69, at 10,264.
73. Advisory Op. No. 1977-70, supra note 69, at 10,264 (Staebler, Comm'r, dissenting):
[T]here is considerable danger that this decision may set a precedent which will
subject the wide field of franchising to similar inclusion within the definition [of
affiliation] and thus bring under the control of a franchisor company, for the purpose of solicitation of political contributions, a wide range of small businesses and
individuals who would not otherwise be included within the scope of executive or
administrative personnel or stockholders of the franchisor company.
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included by regulatory change only.74 Nothing in the legislative history,
they urged, suggested that the term "affiliates" was intended to include
franchise arrangements. 75 The division of opinion represented in the McDonald's decision 76 underscores a significant problem posed by the antiproliferation amendments pointed out by the dissenters: the absence of
reliable guidelines "threaten[s] widespread confusion and raise[s] the possibility of such massive non-compliance as to undermine the credibility of
77
the Act.",
The element of contractual control that the Commission found determinative in the franchise context was also found to be persuasive in a hybrid
franchise-trade association. 78 The International Association of Holiday
Inns, Inc. (Association) was a trade association comprised of both
franchised hotels and those owned and operated by Holiday Inns, Inc. itself. The Commission noted that the Association was a separately incorporated body and that it was financially self-sufficient. 79 Finding,
however, that the corporation contractually authorized the Association's
formation and that it retained the authority to appoint its board members
to the Association, the Commission found the two bodies affiliated for the
purposes of section 441a(a)(5). 8 ° The Commission also noted that the corporation had reserved the power to act as collection agent and arbiter for
the Association and that it imposed substantial restrictions on the Association's advertising, marketing, and use of the Holiday Inn trademark."'
Thus, the Commission's reliance on the contractual obligations and restrictions present in the relationship between the Association and Holiday
Inns, Inc., led it to infer affiliation in what it stated was an ordinarily unaf74. Id at 10,265 (Staebler, Comm'r, dissenting). It must be remembered that the McDonalds opinion was given in response to a request for a ruling of affiliation so that the
corporate PAC could solicit campaign contributions from the franchisees. See note 71
supra. Hence, the dissenters' concern about the possibility of intimidation or coercion by
the franchisor, especially in light of the restrictive control McDonald's Corporation exercised over its franchisees, appears well-founded. See Advisory Op. No. 1977-70, supra note
69, at 10,264. But the majority's emphasis on the degree of contractual control exercised by
the franchisors would seem to limit the effect of the opinion to the facts of the case and
preclude the widespread application to less restrictive franchise agreements of the affiliation
status that the dissenters feared.
75. Id at 10,265.
76. See note 74 supra.

77. Advisory Op. No. 1977-70, supra note 69, at 10,265.
78. Advisory Op. No. 1978-39, supra note 69, at 10,377.
79. Id at 10,376.
80. Id

at 10,377. See also 11 C.F.R. §§ 100. 14(c)(2)(ii)(B)-(C), I l0.3(a)(1)(iii)(B)-(C)

(1977).
81. Advisory Op. No. 1978-39, supra note 69, at 10,377.
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filiated trade association-member corporation relationship.8 2 Although, as
the Commission noted, the relationships between franchisors and franchisees and between trade associations and corporations were not of the kind
typically contemplated to come within the definition of affiliation,83 the
tests applied by the Commission nevertheless sought to identify criteria of
affiliation that reliably described the elements of one PAC's control over
another.
Another indication of affiliation to which the Commission has looked is
the transfer of campaign funds between committees. The importance of
this factor was recognized even before the antiproliferation amendments
were passed84 and has since been the basis for an administrative regulation
affirming the affiliated status of PAC's that are parties to such arrangements.8 5 In reliance on this regulation, the Commission found affiliation
between the Good Government Committee of First Federal Savings of
Miami and the Florida Savings Political Action Committee (FSPAC)
when the former transferred forty percent of its receipts to the latter.8 6
The Commission has also considered similar patterns of contributions to
substantiate findings of affiliation. 87 In its FSPAC opinion, the Commission found, in addition to a funds transfer scheme, the existence of similar
patterns of contributions between two PAC's and based its finding of affiliation, in part, on that criterion.8 8 Similarly, the Commission found the
Constructive Congress Committee (CCC), a PAC, to be affiliated with the
National Association of Electric Companies (NAEC), a trade association,
82. "[Tlhe described manifestations of corporate authority enjoyed by Holiday [Inns,
Inc.] as to the purpose and functions of the Association are what make the situation
presented here unique in comparison to the typical relationships between a trade association
and its corporate membership." Id at 10,376.
83. See notes 75, 82 and accompanying text supra.
84. See Advisory Op. No. 1975-45, supra note 29.
85. "[llndicia [of affiliation] may include ... [tlhe transfer of funds between committees which represent a substantial portion of the funds of either the transferor or transferee
committee .... ." 11 C.F.R. § l10.3(a)(I)(iii)(E) (1977). See also 11 C.F.R. §
100.14(c)(2)(ii)(E) (1977).
86. See Advisory Op. No. 1976-104, FED. ELEC. CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5255, at
10,201-02 (June 20, 1977).
87. 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(a)(1)(iii)(D) (1977). See also 11 C.F.R. § 100.14(c)(2)(ii)(D)
(1977). One of the goals of antiproliferation is to preserve the "independent judgment" of
PAC's in their selection of candidates to whom they wish to contribute. See note 33 and
accompanying text supra. If independent judgment is preserved, then one may expect to see
such independence manifested by varied patterns of campaign contributions. In the absence
of such a manifestation, subsection (D) would appear to presume the existence of affiliation.
88. "[Tlwo-thirds of the Federal candidates to whom the Committee made contributions also received contributions from FSPAC; one-third of the Federal candidates to whom
FSPAC made contributions also received contributions from the Committee." Advisory Op.
No. 1976-104, supra note 86, at 10,202.
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in part because CCC fund-raising efforts evidenced a "continuing pattern
of directing solicitations to personnel of NAEC members"8 9 and a large
percentage of CCC funds were contributed by NAEC personnel. 9°
While contractual obligations and transfers of funds are reasonable indications of common control, the Commission's delineation of similar contribution and solicitation patterns as giving rise to affiliated status raises
problems of overinclusiveness. Since the avowed goal of the antiproliferation amendments is to "curtail the vertical proliferation of political committee contributions,"'" then the Commission must consider only those
indicia of affiliation that truly reflect vertically affiliated relationships
which control and limit the exercise of independent political judgment.
The per se standards of section 441 a(a)(5), by directing their proscriptions
at elements of the corporate organizational framework within which
PAC's are created, reliably indicate those elements of the relationship between two PAC's that allow one PAC to control the affairs of the other. A
number of affiliation indicia similarly describe such a relationship among
PAC's: contractual control of one entity over another; one entity's share in
the ownership of another; and the transfer of substantial funds from one
entity to another. 92 Under an analysis using these indicia, the relationship
among PAC's as alleged in Walther's original complaints would not warrant a finding of affiliation because no element of that relationship would
be shown to afford the AFL-CIO the opportunity or the ability to control
the political affairs of its member unions.
Similar patterns of contributions or solicitations relied upon in the
FSPAC and CCC opinions, however, represent affiliation indicia distinct
from those that reflect elements of control. These factors focus more on
manifestations of common political interests and may not necessarily reflect the lack of a committee's political independence. Moreover, Commission findings that emphasize similar patterns of political fund-raising
activities are likely to be overinclusive. It is conceivable, for example, that
a number of otherwise independent labor union PAC's (or corporate
PAC's) could attract remarkably similar patterns of campaign contributions from essentially the same mailing list of contributors and distribute
them to the same political candidates. Under an analysis focusing on those
indicia of a relationship that most strongly describe elements of control,
89. Advisory Op. No. 1977-2, FED. ELEC. CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5302, at 10,262
(Mar. 27, 1978).
90. Forty-two percent of all donors to the CCC during 1976 were from the NAEC; for
the first quarter of 1976, that figure was 75%. Id
91. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
92. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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nothing in this situation would indicate any subversion of one PAC's independent political judgment by another PAC. Nonetheless, the similar
patterns of contributions factor is incorporated in the Commission's regulations,9 3 and, if applied by the Commission in an analysis similar to that
employed in the FSPAC opinion,94 the Commission might find horizontal
affiliation between such labor union (or corporation) PAC's and limit them
to one $5,000 contribution. The Act does not specifically limit its application to vertical proliferation, but the narrow function of the 1976 amendments was to curb the abuse of one entity establishing more than one
PAC, 95 not to impose severe restrictions on the ability and willingness of
like-minded interest groups and constituencies to contribute to the candidates of their choice.96
The context within which such restrictions may arise, of course, is not
limited to the possibility of findings of horizontal affiliation. Findings of
affiliation between organizations that are ostensibly vertical similarly stray
from the narrow function of the antiproliferation amendments if they are
based on indicia like similarity of patterns of contributions or solicitations.
In the trade association context, for example, there may be no evidence of
control exercised by the association over the political independence of the
association's membership. Indeed, rather than exercising such control
over its members, a trade association may more likely be characterized by
its members' conscious decision to join together to promote their collective
self-interest. However, in the likely event that the trade association and its
members exhibit similar patterns of fund-raising activity, reliance on indicia such as similar patterns of contributions could be the basis for an affiliation finding where no control exists.
The threshhold danger in an expansive definition of affiliation that embraces more than the specific elements of control inherent in a particular
relationship is that it threatens to link PAC's on the basis of their political
ideology and not of their organizational structure. Findings of affiliation
93. See note 87 and accompanying text supra.
94. Advisory Op. No. 1976-104, note 86 supra.
95. The antiproliferation amendments were summarized by Representative Hays: "Locals of a union, subsidiaries of a corporation, and other similarly structured groups are
treated as part of the parent with respect to the $5,000 limitation on contributions to one
candidate or political committee." 122 CONG. REc. 12,201 (May 3, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Hays) (emphasis added).
96. Implicit in several subsections of the 1976 amendments is the notion that two or
more PAC's might have common political aims and may, in fact, cooperate to achieve those
aims without being affiliated for purposes of the contribution limitations. For example, §
441a(a)(5)(A) excludes transfers between political committees of funds raised through joint
fund-raising efforts from the antiproliferation provisions. Section 441a(a)(2)(C) allows one
PAC to contribute up to $5,000 to another PAC.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 29:713

would thus fail to conform to the legislative purposes of the antiproliferation amendments. The resulting uncertainty faced by candidates offered
campaign funds by such potentially affiliated organizations could strain
the credibility of the Act.
If the court's decision in Walher means that a per se rule of nonaffiliation is, in fact, nonexistent, then most proliferation problems will require
an analysis of indicia of affiliation. Such an analysis will succeed in recognizing instances of the proliferation of PAC's from a source of common
control only if the Commission consistently employs indicia of affiliation
that most nearly reflect the circumstances of proliferation that the 1976
amendments were designed to prohibit. Thus, the Commission's analysis
will recognize proliferation and find affiliation among PAC's when it is
shown that specific elements of a parent entity's relationship with its
subordinate entities provide for the parent entity's authority and ability to
exercise control over the affairs of the subordinate entities. The exercise of
such control compromises the independent character of contributions from
the PAC's of those entities. When, on the other hand, nothing more is
shown of the relationships among PAC's than similar patterns of political
activity, then the imposition of affiliation status on those PAC's is unrelated to any element of control among those PAC's and fails to address the
proliferation of commonly controlled PAC's to which the 1976 amendments were directed.
Analyses of the indicia of affiliation severely tax both the time 97 and the
resources 98 of the Commission. If Walther's emphasis on such analyses
increases that burden, an expansive approach to affiliation may tax the
Commission's adjudicative machinery even more. In addition, the time
lag that necessarily accompanies a Commission investigation of affiliation
indicia prejudices the efforts of candidates to plan their election campaigns
efficiently. In view of the district court's interpretation of section
441a(a)(5) in Walther and the pending of other complaints from Walther
and the NRWC, 99 any candidate who accepts contributions from COPE
97. For example, for over two years the Commission has been investigating the possibil-

ity of affiliation between the American Medical Association's PAC (AMPAC) and the
PAC's of state medical associations. See Advisory Op. No. 1978-47, FED. ELEC. CAMP. FIN.
GUIDE (CCH) 5338 (Aug. 28, 1978); Advisory Op. No. 1977-40, FED. ELEC. CAMP. FIN.
GUIDE (CCH) 5296 (Mar. 16, 1978).
98. The Commission's budget for Fiscal Year 1979 was $8 million. FEC ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1978).
99. Walther and the NRWC apparently plan to file new complaints that will attempt to
avoid the flaws that proved fatal to their earlier actions. See Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of Actions Joined as
M.D.L. Docket No. 372 at 1-2, In re Federal Election Campaign Act Litigation, 474 F.
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and the PAC's of AFL-CIO member unions totalling more than $5,000
will be unsure of whether he has accepted funds in violation of the Act."o
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 1976 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act treat all
political action committees affiliated with a corporation or labor organization as one committee and limit those committees to a single $5,000 contribution per candidate per election in order to prevent a corporation or labor
organization from evading the campaign contribution limits of the Act.
The amendments create two standards by which affiliation is determined:
aperse rule of affiliation and a rule of reason approach that requires caseby-case analysis based on various indicia of affiliation.
The Walther decision restricted the application of theper se rule, requiring the Commission to analyze the status of all arguably affiliated organizations. Yet, the application of the affiliation provisions to corporations
and labor organizations remains largely undetermined at a time when the
approaching 1980 elections demand clarity and certainty of interpretation
for prospective contributors and candidates. Absent an established judicial approach to the affiliation question, candidates and contributors must
operate in an atmosphere of some uncertainty regarding the legality of
particular campaign contributions. Such uncertainty can be minimized,
however, by a Commission focus on indicia of affiliation that reflect common control. Such factors address the abuse at which the antiproliferation
amendments were directed; namely, the creation of multiple political action committees subservient to the political orientation of the organization
establishing them. Reliance on indicators such as similar patterns of political activity, on the other hand, may yield an overinclusive definition of
affiliation that will confuse campaign participants, overburden the Federal
Election Commission, and obscure the true goals of the antiproliferation
amendments.
John Egan

Supp. 1051 (D.D.C. 1979) (M.D.L. Docket No. 372, Misc. No. 79-0136, C.A. Nos. 78-2097,

78-2193).
100. Despite the Commission's indecision regarding the AMPAC matter, see note 97
supra, it advised candidates that if it eventually determines that AMPAC and the state medical association PAC's were affiliated, the candidates would have to return the excessive
contributions and may be found to be in violation of the Act. See, e.g., Advisory Op. No.
1977-40, supra note 97, at 10,247.

